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ABSTRACT 
Though typical malware delivery vectors, behaviors, and general “attack craft” 
can be verbally explained and even illustrated, greater familiarity and confidence is 
imbued in the cyber defender when such theoretical explanations are followed by guided 
practical exercises that provide realistic scenarios. To demonstrate this, we created seven 
scenarios utilizing common attack types combined with prominent artifacts for indicators 
of compromise and prominent incident investigative tools. These scenarios will help 
facilitate the educational experience for students as well as instill confidence, resulting in 
more proficient incident response across the field. Should this type of education become a 
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Cyber incident response encompasses all knowledge, skills, abilities and tools that 
may be employed to detect, analyze and recover from all adverse events that may violate 
a given security policy. How an organization cultivates its incident response directly 
correlates with its overall security and defense against potential virtual threats. The 
practice of utilizing virtual machines (VMs) for the purpose of response training provides 
useful hands-on experience. It also supports each student’s ability to accurately recognize 
prominent artifacts of compromise.  
A. WHAT IS CYBER INCIDENT RESPONSE? 
Cyber incident response involves numerous phases and cannot be qualified as one 
specific event or item. Essentially, cyber incident response is defined as the process of 
detecting an event that has occurred or is occurring through the resolution of the issue. 
The process itself and all that it entails is incident response. Ideally, an organization 
would have durable attack-and-exploit prevention measures in place and thus be resistant 
to an attack. However, with techniques and motives ever-changing, it is not realistic to 
think that any organization is immune to threat. Therefore, a plan of action for incident 
response is necessary. 
1. The Defense Continuum 
To say that the process of incident response is cyclical in nature is an 
understatement. It (ideally) begins with preparation, but it does not end with lessons-
learned. It is the response team’s responsibility to make the most of those lessons and to 
apply them toward the preparation (cycle completed) of future incidents. It is a process of 
constant work to strive for improvement. Continuous effort has to be applied to not only 
detect and eradicate problems/attacks, but also to remain steps ahead of those who might 
want to cause harm. The defense continuum essentially includes deterring, preventing, 
detecting, investigating and recovering from cyber incidents. Because the defense 
continuum is recurrent, it provides steps linking the process and thus a guide for carrying 
out the most efficient security possible.  
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2. Preparation 
An excellent place to start when attempting to build an incident response 
capability is with preparation—the more the better. Although the preparation phase of 
incident response falls outside the scope of this research, it is valuable to discuss it here 
for capturing the bigger picture.  
Before a team can approach an organization with the intent of minimizing the risk 
of cyber incidents, they must first ensure their own readiness to respond. Though it may 
seem relatively simple, or even trite, one of the most important factors of preparation is 
defining the mission (Luttgens, Mandia, & Pepe, 2014). It is critical to have a well-
developed understanding of exactly what the team’s goal is. Defining the “goal” is an 
important part of scoping what capabilities are required of an incident response team. 
This scoping then drives the pursuit of tools, skills, training, team membership, 
organization, procedures, etc., that will yield an effective incident response team. 
Having a thorough understanding of an organization’s policies is also useful. 
Policies are typically documents that establish dicta, or precepts, regarding an 
organization’s high-level expectations for a range of issues that contribute to 
accomplishing the organization’s mission. Though personnel issues (i.e., behavior, 
conflict resolution, grievances) are included among issues addressed by policy, we are 
most interested in policies pertaining to cyber security. Because incident response 
services are often provided via a third-party contractor, it is necessary that such external 
providers understand which policies may inhibit, or even prevent, what otherwise may be 
the provider’s “standard” response action. 
Another significant step during the preparation phase is establishing reliable 
means of communication. Both internal and external communication must be taken into 
account. With regard to internal communication, the following options may help ensure 
the integrity and confidentiality of potentially sensitive discussions and customer data 
exchanges (Luttgens et al., 2014): 
 Encrypt emails 
 Properly label all documents and communications 
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 Monitor conference call participation 
 Use case numbers or project names to refer to an investigation. 
A team’s need for appropriate detection and attack-management tools is 
irrefutable. 
3. Identification 
Once an organization is sufficiently prepared for an incident, the next phase is 
identification. This phase has two responsibilities. The first entails detecting (noticing) 
“questionable” events. The second entails determining—via appropriate investigation—
whether a given cyber-related event (or logically related collection of events) constitutes 
an incident or not. This is especially significant because, if an actual (i.e., true-positive) 
incident goes undetected, there will be no subsequent call for any containment or 
eradication action, resulting in a compromised state of the affected cyber system for an 
untold amount of time. Therefore, this initial identification of an incident is absolutely 
critical for the Response Team to make, and to make as early and accurately as possible.  
As it pertains to detection in the identification phase, Tondel, Line and Jaatun 
(2014) reference a study in which incidents were detected in three specific ways: 
 By local system and service administrators reporting incidents manually 
by phone or email 
 From automatic security warnings from DFN-CERT or reports from other 
third party services 
 Through local security monitoring mechanisms (Tondel et al., 2014). 
Local detection seems to be one of the most significant factors in reports studied. 
Proximity to the network would allow for more prompt detection and response. In 
addition, one could make the argument that a thorough examination of the methods and 
processing of the detection is particularly relevant. This is because a critical look at how 
identification was made would help the Incident Response Team determine whether there 
was a false positive reported, thereby conserving invaluable time, energy, and resources. 
Luttgens, Pepe, and Mandia (2014) provide a generalized checklist to take into 
account the main questions the members of an incident response team should ask 
 4 
themselves upon notification of detection. These questions not only deal with how an 
incident is detected, but with the detection system itself. Things like whether the 
detection was done through an automated or manual process; the sources that provided 
the data; if the source data was validated as accurate; if the source data was preserved; 
and the detection and error rates all must be taken into consideration during the detection 
process. What leads and contributes to detection is just as important and relevant as 
managing that which may come from it. It is worth noting here that this phase will be a 
main focus for the purpose of this research as the training provided via Virtual Machines 
will require the user to make such determinations. 
4. Containment 
Once an incident has been confirmed to have occurred, the next step is to contain 
the problem and/or problem area. Initially, the severity of the attack should be assessed in 
order to effectively determine the degree of the response and resources required (Luttgens 
et al., 2014). 
A key motive during the Containment Phase is to ensure that the attackers are 
unaware that they have been discovered. There are many reasons for this, but, essentially, 
the main purpose is to avoid evoking a reaction from the attacker (Luttgens et al., 2014). 
Should the attackers become aware that they have been discovered, they could alter their 
behavior and actions in such a way that would make it difficult for investigators to 
determine the breadth of damage done, thereby also impeding the eventual eradication 
process. 
5. Eradication 
Once the incident has been contained and the Team has been able to establish the 
degree and reach of the attack, the process of eradication begins. 
The purpose of the Eradication Phase is to completely clean the affected systems 
of whatever deleterious incident effects/artifices have been “deposited” on those systems 
(Luttgens et al., 2014). Such effects/artifices are most typically one of either a) added or 
modified accounts, or b) malware residing in memory and/or storage that remains active 
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or under future actuation control of a remote controller. Eradication needs to precede 
recovery as any attempt at recovery without having first eradicated, would be analogous 
to painting over rust to protect metal from further oxidization (Luttgens et al., 2014). The 
first step in completing this task is to develop an eradication plan. The main goal of this 
plan is to remove the attacker’s access to, and presence on, the system entirely. It is 
important to note that this plan should take into consideration the possibility that the 
attacker may try to regain access during either the Eradication or Recovery Phases 
(Luttgens et al., 2014). 
There are two issues of timing that are essential to this phase: when the 
eradication is to take place and how long it will last. The former is so that the Team can 
ensure that every attacker avenue of access (vector) has been thoroughly considered and 
mitigated/blocked. The latter is important because the longer the phase lasts, the more 
opportunity the attacker has to reestablish their connection elsewhere in the system 
(Luttgens et al., 2014). 
6. Recovery 
The Recovery Phase entails bringing any affected systems back into operation 
and/or back online. Affected systems should be properly evaluated to ensure that they are 
free of malicious content, fully functional, secure, and safe for use. 
At the end of the Recovery Phase, the entire system should be restored and 
operate in such a way as to have the appearance that there was never any hindrance to 
begin with. 
7. Lessons Learned 
Perhaps one of the most important phases of this cycle is that of Lessons Learned. 
While proper and detailed documentation is a requirement throughout the execution of 
every process in this response cycle, it is here especially relevant. 
This is the phase in which all incident-related data is marshaled and assessed for 
potential application going forward. A review of the security controls that were in place 
at the time the attacker gained access is necessary so as to ascertain what preventive 
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controls failed, and/or what detection controls might have provided earlier detection. It is 
important to evaluate both what worked and what failed. This is an opportunity to 
leverage information gained from the most recent attack response, in order to improve 
attack prevention and response going forward.  
B. IMPORTANCE OF CYBER TECHNOLOGY IN THE NAVY 
As the 21st century dawned, nearly every aspect of human activity had 
become irrevocably intertwined with cyber space, from the public global 
Internet and its newer military counterparts to GPS precision location, 
navigation, and timing to financial transactions and personal 
communications (Wilson, 2014, pp. 8–9). 
The advent of cyber (i.e., computer-based) technology has proven to be quite 
beneficial; it allows for—at its very core—people to complete tasks in seconds that once 
may have taken days. Due to this convenience and potential for great use, the Navy’s 
reliance upon technology has paralleled that of its civilian counterpart. However, the 
potential down-side to this is an entrenched “dependency” that creates a distinct and 
relatively new kind of vulnerability: a heavily automated system-of-systems that presents 
a large target surface area to the cyber-savvy enemy. It is this high dependency on 
systems with numerous vulnerabilities that militates for the Navy to pursue ever-
improving risk management capabilities. An excellent way to illustrate this is to examine 
changes over time and how the Navy has adapted accordingly. 
1. Historical Examples 
“Computers” first debuted their capability during WWII as establishing their 
ability to crack codes. “Magic” allowed U.S. forces to decipher Japanese codes in an 
arena in which Allies had to sometimes interact with Axis parties out of material 
necessity (Arquilla, 2011). “The age of computers in battle that has unfolded in the past 
70 years has proved similar to earlier eras in military history, with these new 
informational tools pointing to new practices” (Arquilla, 2011, p. 59). 
As technology changes, the Navy should be quick and adept at accepting, 
adapting to, and mastering its ability to operate new technologies in a manner that 
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maintains or improves its tactical advantage in combat. The cyber environment is just the 
newest and most fertile new technological change to expand upon in that regard. 
Fortunately, it is apparent that the significance of cyber activities has come to the 
forefront of discussion. The Navy, specifically in recent years, has shown great strides in 
its overall awareness of the need for skilled technicians in this area. This can be 
evidenced in the U.S. Navy Information Dominance Roadmap—2013–2028 and the 
creation of the Task Force Cyber Awakening (TFCA) (Wilson, 2014). 
Matthew H. Swartz, director of Communications and Networks Division 
(N2/N6F1) and TFCA lead spoke to a roundtable in October of 2014 and stated this: 
In the last decade, DOD—and specifically the Navy—has been forced to 
reassess our risk calculus for cyber, to understand from a risk perspective 
what we need to do to address this growing area. Because of that, we had 
to make sure we understood the risks of cyber as we move forward 
(Wilson, 2014, p. 7). 
This statement not only reflects the awareness for the need to definitively and 
actively research the future of the cyber arena, but also the urgency to explore the 
potential weaknesses within current practice and policy. It also highlights the uncertainty 
involved in making a conclusive statement regarding what “cyber” actually encompasses. 
The fact is that the amount of cyber threats, attacks, and espionage that have 
transpired within the last decade have pushed the Navy into amending its approach to the 
cyber environment.  
In 2007, there were numerous distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks was 
perpetrated against Estonia. Estonia’s government and private-sector information 
technology infrastructures were put at risk. Russia was first thought to be behind the 
attacks. This was because the attacks appeared to have come from servers located in 
Russia. However, because of the anonymity afforded to some hackers, it was later 
determined that “zombie computers” could have been used and taken control of by 
anyone. Even Estonians themselves could have been the perpetrators in an attempt to 
reinforce anti-Russian feelings. No retaliation occurred (Guinchard, 2011).  
Canada is another nation that has been struck by cyber attacks. The Treasury 
Board, the Finance Department and Defense Research and Development Canada were the 
victims. The impact lasted for approximately two months. The thought at the time was 
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that the hackers were attempting to gain advance knowledge of the federal budget. Their 
proposed national budget maintains confidentiality due to the fact that once it is 
submitted to Parliament, changes cannot be made. This is thought to be the purpose of the 
attack. Advance knowledge of the federal budget can be used for personal financial gain. 
Unfortunately, it is practically impossible to officially determine the target of or reason 
for the attack because whoever perpetrated the attack was ultimately never discovered. 
Though the attack was traced to China’s servers, China may have not been the culprit of 
the attack. Someone else could have chosen China to be the smoke screen for the attack 
to help achieve anonymity, or perhaps to misplace blame, or to otherwise confound the 
incident investigators (Pfleeger & Pfleeger, 2012). 
There were two main components to the attack perpetrated against Canada. First 
“executive spear phishing” was used to take over the computers of senior officials. Once 
this was completed, messages were sent to their internal Information Technology 
department from individuals posing as the officials. The purpose of this was to gain 
access of passwords for key systems. “The second component was lacing PDF files with 
hidden programs and forwarding them to others in the above departments” (Van Dusen, 
2013, p. 5). The perpetrators were again relying upon impersonation of the officials who 
owned the email accounts to convince the recipients of their legitimacy. Upon opening 
the PDFs, the malicious programs began to execute and simultaneously route confidential 
and private information back to the attackers (Pfleeger & Pfleeger, 2012). 
The Stuxnet worm used in 2010 is also an example of the effective use of a cyber 
attack. This worm was used against nuclear facilities in Iran. Stuxnet had two main 
purposes. One function was to “force Iran’s centrifuges to spin out of control” (Gervais, 
2012, p. 37). The other goal for Stuxnet was to simultaneously convince operators that 
the centrifuges were functioning as though nothing was wrong (Van Dusen, 2013). 
Stuxnet was also designed to upload information about the system it infected, which 
effectively made it not only a denial of service cyber weapon, but also a reconnaissance 
(information gathering) tool for additional attacks (Gervais, 2012). This attack reportedly 
set back Iran’s their nuclear program by a minimum of two years (Slocombe, 2012). Iran 
chose to retaliate in the summer of 2011. That attack, directed in part against the 
 9 
Netherlands, was so massive that it “led the Dutch Justice Minister to warn the only 
secure way to communicate with the Dutch government at that time was with pen, paper, 
or fax” (Slocombe, 2012, p. 38).  
More recently, in 2013, a cyber intrusion was experienced from the United States 
Army Corps of Engineers National Inventory of Dams. The database that this system 
encompasses is around 8,100 major dams in the United States. The infiltration of such a 
system has numerous potential ramifications (Wilson, 2014). 
2. Cyberspace Damage Control 
The question becomes, now that the Navy has acknowledged the cyber 
environment as a place for further cultivation, exploration, and investment, what can be 
done to diminish the likelihood that our cyber vulnerabilities will be exploited? The 
answer is simple: preparedness. The key to getting ahead of adversaries is to be aware 
that they are coming, to be aware of the attacks/exploits they are bringing with them, and 
to be cognizant of the tactics they are likely to. 
Cyberspace has been widely accepted as the fifth domain of warfare (1-Sea, 2-
Air, 3-Land, 4-Space, and 5-Cyberspace). Eom, Kim, Kim, and Chung (2012) make the 
argument for the need for cyber superiority as well as for the development of a “cyber 
warrior.” They contend that the cyber warrior should have thorough knowledge of 
military policies, cyber strategy, cyber tactics, cyber operations, cyber intelligence 
collection, as well as cyber attack and cyber defense technology. The concept of having a 
distinct and separate force dedicated to strictly understanding and operating within the 
cyber realm is not only interesting, but a practical way of mitigating the risk of attack on 
our systems while also improving our ability to efficiently attack the systems of our 
adversaries. 
This movement also elevated information technology (IT) from the “nerd” 
department responsible for keeping an organization’s phones and 
computers working to the heart of secure data and networking (Wilson, 
2014, p. 3). 
Not only should all military personnel have a basic comprehension of proper 
cyber use policies, there should also be a concentration of individuals with a background 
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in cyber warfare specifically. This is the only way to truly defend against threats while 
also being capable of perpetrating such threats against our (U.S.) adversaries when it is 
militarily prudent to do so.  
C. TRAINING DIFFICULTIES 
1. Labs and Fleet-Wide Scalability 
The Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) has a Cyber Battle Lab (CYBL). A cyber 
battle lab “offers state of the art network and computer systems to build large scale 
computer networks and computing environments for experimentation” (Terry et al., 2014, 
p. 1). The CYBL is disconnected from the school’s internal network (intranet) to allow 
red team operators to attack blue team operators and to practice using a wide variety of 
tools for offense and defense without the fear of hurting the school’s local area network 
(NPS, 2015). This type of lab allows students to connect to the virtual environment 
provided by the cyber battle lab, from anywhere in the world. This type of environment is 
excellent for teaching the next generation of incident handlers how to detect various types 
of attacks that can happen on a network, and to mitigate or eradicate such threats as they 
are discovered. There are only so many workstations that can be logged into the lab at 
any given time. Though it would be ideal for every network defender in the fleet to have 
access to a cyber lab, it is just not possible. A cyber battle lab is better suited for “A” 
schools, “C” schools and universities. Sailors in the fleet need a way to practice using 
various tools to detect and respond to real world attacks without necessitating access to a 
high-tech cyber battle lab. 
2. Threat and Vulnerability Selection 
The list of threats and vulnerabilities that exist in the world of cyber defense is 
forever changing and growing. This can be overwhelming for many to even think about. 
The important aspect of cyberattack detection is to know what normal behavior looks like 
on any given network. It is impossible to know every attack and vulnerability that exists, 
but practicing with various tools can help an incident responder detect when something is 
not quite right, and then respond to it. The Navy mostly utilizes Windows operating 
systems (OS). In order to develop adequate lab scenarios for incident responders to 
 11 
properly detect and respond to potential incidents, we should look at the areas that are 
most likely to be attacked, and where an attacker can cause the most damage.  
There are numerous different areas that can be attacked on a Windows OS. It is 
prudent then, given the limited training time available, to focus on high-occurrence 
and/or high-impact WinOS-based attacks. Particular areas of interest are NTFS and file 
system analysis, Windows prefetch, event logs, scheduled tasks, the Registry, memory 
forensics and alternative persistence mechanisms (Luttgens et al., 2014). 
D. HOW TO MITIGATE THESE CHALLENGES 
Not all sailors have access to a CYBL. For those who do not, it is important to 
configure a way for them to receive necessary incident response training. This will ensure 
that they will be able to perform their duties regarding cyber security efficiently, 
regardless of circumstance or location. The use of VM is a perfect aid. By creating and 
providing scenarios directed toward detecting, resolving, and recovering from threats in a 
VM environment, we are able to provide a hands-on experience to those who may not 
otherwise have the opportunity to engage safely and constructively with these situations. 
We have created seven scenarios via VM use that will enable the operator to experience 
and experiment with different types of threats and how to deal with them. 
The benefits of using a VM for educational purposes may not be readily apparent. 
However, further discussion will show its worth for exactly this purpose. A VM is 
delivered simplistically; easily reverted to a normative state; and functions without 
inflicting harm on the physical machine. In addition, use of a VM allows for the 
instructor to focus the training to items that tend to require more need for investigation. 
Things like the Registry, processes, tasks, accounts, etc., are all among the items that are 
most likely to show that an incident has occurred. Network services also possess specific 
items of interest that should catch a user’s attention. 
The use of VM also allows the instructor to highlight the best incident 
investigative tools. This allows the user to become more comfortable with not only what 
to look for, but what they will need to utilize to identify and remedy a threat or attack. 
Tools like the QuickChecksum Verifier, PEView, TCP and Regshot may be common, yet 
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are advantageous for the user to be well versed in their use. Having a firm understanding 
of the command line and all that can be gleaned from it is also beneficial. Because the 
command line is built into every Windows operating system, it is evident that a user 
should become quite familiar with it. NETSTAT, viewing events, and system file 
integrity are all tools that provide a starting point for investigation.  
The Navy should consider having an IT incident response team at every command 
that is trained exclusively to handle cyber incidents. They should be required to conduct 
incident response training through VM to keep their skills sharp and at the same time, 
learning how to properly respond to new threats that emerge. The Navy severely lacks 
adequate training and organization as it pertains to incident response. If cyberspace is the 
new domain of warfare, we must assume that our networks are already infiltrated. Our 
Navy’s Information System Technicians should and must be more focused on the security 
of our information systems than just fixing hardware and software issues. This research 
demonstrates a convenient way to accomplish this training regardless of a sailor’s 
location. 
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II. THE MERITS OF VIRTUAL MACHINES FOR INCIDENT 
RESPONSE EDUCATION 
The benefits of using virtual machines for the purpose of incident response 
education are many. Providing students with the opportunity to interact with a 
threat/attack that has been pre-captured in a virtual machine (VM) gives the student the 
chance to experiment with the information learned and apply what they have learned in a 
controlled setting. In addition, the teacher has the ability to view, analyze, and respond to 
the students’ reaction to the variables offered by each scenario. 
A. THE VM CONCEPT 
Virtualization refers to a concept in which access to a single underlying 
piece of hardware, like a server, is coordinated so that multiple guest 
operating systems can share that single piece of hardware, with no guest 
operating system being aware that it is actually sharing anything at all. A 
guest operating system appears to the applications running on it as a 
complete operating system (OS), and the guest OS itself is completely 
unaware that it’s running on top of a layer of virtualization software rather 
than directly on the physical hardware (Golden, 2008, p. 10). 
Essentially, a virtual machine operates on top of the actual machine and can be 
configured to run a variety of operating systems. There is a plethora of benefits to 
utilizing such an architecture for the purpose of incident response testing. These are 
highlighted in the sections that follow. 
B. SELF-CONTAINED AND PORTABLE 
When computers were first created, their true capacity and potential was likely 
unforeseen at the time. However, the leaps and bounds technology has made since the 
first computers’ inception are undeniable. The advent of laptops and smart phones meant 
we were able to complete our computing needs on the go. This characteristic 
revolutionized how we are able to get things done, as sometimes it is simply not feasible 
to be physically present at a certain location with so many responsibilities drawing our 
attentions away. 
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The same concept is applied to the use of virtual machines. Students will be able 
to work on and with their attack detection and response skills anywhere, as their virtual 
machines can be delivered via drop box or flash drive and run on top of VM-compatible 
laptops. Users can also save, copy, and move their environment from machine to 
machine. Michael Price (2008) discusses the benefits of copying a VM and files to a flash 
drive and taking it “with you wherever you go.” Because the educational environment 
may extend across location—as in the instance when a student is underway—and may 
not have access to server-based VMs, this is extremely useful. The instructor has the 
ability to set a return time for when a particular lesson may be handed in. Upon doing so, 
the instructor then may inspect what has or has not been completed. In addition, a report 
may accompany the work completed, and what attempts were made can be documented 
by the student for the instructor’s evaluation. 
C. EASILY RECOVERABLE 
As is the case when any novice is learning and practicing new skills, there is a 
chance for something to go wrong. One educational advantage of using virtual machines 
is that students can gain hands-on experience with actual attacks in a controlled setting. 
However, mistakes can happen, making it all the more necessary to have precautions in 
place to ensure that any issue can be readily corrected so work may resume. 
One of the best educational outcomes of using Virtual Machines is that they can 
be promptly reconfigured to a previous—good—state! So, if a student compromises his 
VM during training, he would be able to revert or renew his VM to its previously non-
compromised state and continue working. Because the virtual machine and physical host 
practically exist independently, no damage is suffered by the host OS or physical 
machine. The VM configuration is simply a set of parameters backed up by the Snapshot 
Function. 
D. INCIDENT RESPONSE TRAINING UTILIZING VMWARE 
Incident responders throughout the Navy do not all have access to cyber battle 
labs. There is however, an alternative that can be effective. VMWare software can be 
downloaded from the VMware website that can install a virtual machine on just about 
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any workstation (i.e., any host OS). After this software is downloaded, an OS of the users 
choosing can also be downloaded to run on “top of” the host OS (the guest OS). The 
Navy could utilize Navy Knowledge Online (NKO) to provide various attacks that can be 
downloaded onto Virtual Machines from NKO that are placed securely on the website by 
a trained IT professional. This would allow the command’s incident response plan to be 
practiced in real time, from the Identification to the Lessons Learned phases. Having this 
capability would give the network defenders the chance to look at attacks at their leisure, 
when new tools hit the market, new attacks are placed on NKO, or when tasked to 
practice/train by their chain of command. 
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III. PROMINENT ARTIFACTS FOR INDICATORS 
OF COMPROMISE 
Arguably, one of the most difficult aspects of incident response is the ability to 
narrow down specific factors of the incident itself. Locating and fixing the problem 
area(s) is ultimately the point of incident response. Therefore, understanding what the 
common artifacts are that typically indicate an attack or a place of compromise—as well 
as where to look for them—is paramount. These items can be considered and either 
dismissed as irrelevant, or further researched to provide direct answers or suggest leads 
for further investigation. A superb foundation and place to start can be established by 
examining the things that are typically good indicators of exploitation. 
A. WINDOWS OPERATING SYSTEM 
The Windows Operating System was chosen for the purpose of this project due to 
its pervasiveness throughout the United States Navy. Because the majority of the 
computers utilized by the Navy function with this system, it was evident that further 
analysis and research into its architecture and defense should be the primary focus. Thus, 
below are enumerated the primary components of the Windows Operating System that 
are of most utility as indicators of compromise (IOC). 
1. Registry 
The Registry is considered central to the Windows Operating System (WOS). It, 
in and of itself, is the foundation for much of the information available from the system. 
The Registry is the “primary database of configuration data” and the amount of data that 
can be gleaned from it is extensive. In addition, as the system itself developed in 
complexity, so too has the amount of intelligence that can be tracked—and potentially 
manipulated within the Registry (Luttgens et al., 2014). 
The Registry is organized into two different types of hives: system and user-
specific. User-specific Registry hives can be found within each user’s profile directory. 
Hives are generally stored in a single file on a disk. They are not human readable but can 
be parsed using many different tools. However, one cannot copy hive files with Windows 
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Explorer. Instead a forensic imaging or some sort of acquisition tool to copy them is 
required. There are five central Registry hives in the path: 
 
%SYSTEMROOT%\system32\config: SYSTEM, SECURITY, SOFTWARE, 
SAM, and DEFAULT. 
 
These are hive file names with no extension (Luttgens et al., 2014). 
Registry data is stored within a tree formation and is comprised of three items: 
keys, values, and data (Luttgens et al., 2014). The layout of this information can be 
viewed within the Windows native Registry editor (regedit.exe). The key represents a 
path, the value is similar to the naming of a file and the data reflects the true information 
contained therein. The amount of information that can be monitored, gathered, and 
maliciously altered within this framework is enormous. There are numerous encodings in 
which Registry data is stored, and it is because of this that Registry values are human 
readable whereas other items are not. Per Luttgens et al. (2014), the main rootkit 
registries are as follows: 
 HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE (aka HKLM) 
 HKEY_USERS (aka HKU) 
 HKEY_CURRENT_USER (aka HKCU) 
 HKEY_CURRENT_CONFIG (aka HKCC) 
 HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT. 
Registry keys contain a single timestamp. They have an associated 
LastWriteTime set when the key is created. The timestamp is also updated whenever any 
values under the keys are changed. However, changes to subkey values do not impact the 
parent key’s timestamp. In addition, Registry timestamps are only affiliated with keys 
and not values or data therein. Timestamps are helpful in that, by using file system 
metadata and other evidence that a key was changed during a period of known hacker 
activity, one could assume the change was made by an unauthorized party. 
There are limitations of using a timestamp of a Registry key. If there are a 
significant number of other keys—particularly within the same or nested paths—updated 
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within the same second or minute, it is probable that there has been a legitimate change 
brought about by the operating system, software update, or even a security application 
such as an antivirus program (Luttgens et al., 2014). 
Because the nature of the Registry is that it is the foundation of the Windows 
Operating System, the amount of evidence that can be attained is vast. However, Luttgens 
et al. (2014) provide a consolidated list of keys and values they found to be of high 
significance in their experience with incident response: System Configuration Registry 
Keys, Shim Cache, Common Auto-Run Registry Keys, and User Hive Registry Keys. 
2. Processes 
A process is essentially a series of actions taken to reach a desired endpoint/goal. 
In computing terms, a process refers to an instance of a program that is being executed. In 
order to accomplish anything on an operating system, a process must be run (Luttgens et 
al., 2014). 
Per Regalado, Harris, and Harper (2015), an important action that needs to 
transpire regarding processes is that of monitoring. Process Monitor, as its name implies, 
is a process monitoring tool for Windows that provides a real-time view of the file, 
system, Registry, and process/thread activity. A useful feature of this monitor is that it 
allows for the customization of the filter so the user is able to adjust what they are 
looking at and searching for. This way, the operator is able to focus on the data he/she is 
most interested in and not be completely overwhelmed with information. 
3. Files of Interest 
Because there is a plethora of ways in which a hacker may exploit a targeted 
computer, it is important to be able to have a method for sorting through all of the 
information available. Files that are inexplicably altered are considered to be “files of 
interest.” These alterations can be anything from an atypical file name, to an incorrect 
hash, or an improper location in the file system (Luttgens et al., 2014). In addition, 
examining first, those files that have historically been specifically targeted is also 
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preferable from a finding the “signal among the noise” investigative perspective 
(Luttgens et al., 2014). 
An excellent example of this are auto-run keys. These keys are intended to allow 
for Windows executable files, Dynamic Link Libraries (DLLs), and other components to 
load upon system boot, user login, and other conditions. Because these keys are executed 
during the boot and/or user login procedure, and are by design intended to operate 
transparently, these auto-run keys tend to be a favorite attack target for hackers. 
Fortunately, there are analytical techniques that can be applied to any type of Registry-
based auto-run. Using these types of techniques can aid in narrowing down what data 
requires further examination. 
Jason Luttgens, Kevin Mandia, and Matthew Pepe (2014) discuss the tendency of 
some incident response personnel to attempt to “eyeball” malicious auto-runs. They 
advocate against this because they consider it easy to make a mistake via this method. 
They demonstrate this by listing four keys with a ServiceName, Description and 
ImagePath for each. They indicate that one of these is malicious and pose the question 
asking if the reader is able to identify the “bad one.” The three that were legitimate keys 
had issues that would seemingly be cause for concern. These “anomalies” included 
spelling errors, lack of a description, the directory from which one is run, and a 
punctuation error. However, the keys with these attributes were all deemed to be 
legitimate. The key that was malicious was so because “an attacker had modified the 
ServiceDll to point to a malicious file, iprinp32.dll, rather than the correct DLL file name, 
iprip.dll” (2014). 
Their recommendation is to consider the “Registry-based persistence 
mechanisms” and consider only those that one should include versus exclude. Some of 
the things to be excluded are persistent binaries signed by publishers and items created 
outside the—if known—time frame examined. The Team should also consider paths of 
remaining persistent binaries and critically look at common directories. These are just 
some ways to focus the initial “triage” examination that is so useful in further funneling-
down where additional, more in-depth, incident research should lead (Luttgens et al., 
2014). 
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4. Network Connections 
The information in this section is entirely based on the work of Luttgens et al. 
(2014).  
Network monitoring is absolutely crucial for incident detection. Because a 
machine’s connectedness to other machines is via the network, the network provides the 
main vector of attack/exploit delivery to targeted machines. There are four network data 
types that can be collected here. They are: alert data, session data, full packet data, and 
statistical data. 
Alert data tend to be quite common for organizations to utilize. Essentially an 
alert is generated when the alert sensor (e.g., IDS or IPS) detects an event (or several) 
that has been deemed to be suspicious, if not explicitly malicious. Both network-based 
and host-based intrusion detection systems can generate these alerts.  
Packet header data monitoring is useful but only provides a portion of packet 
capturing whereas full packet logging is just how it sounds in that it provides a more 
thorough picture of what is happening. The main purpose of full packet logging is to 
gather information that has been exchanged between systems so that a transactional 
“story” can be stitched together, and so that signatures of interest can be identified. It is 
important to note that at the beginning of an incident investigation, it may be preferable 
to initially cast a “wider net” and capture and treat all data as potentially important, then 
become more narrowly selective as the course of the investigation continues. 
High-level network statistics offer a “view of what connections, or flows, traverse 
the network” (Luttgens et al., 2014, p. 188). This data can be most helpful when 
endpoints involved in an incident are not yet known. It is also useful because it aids in the 
identification of patterns that may otherwise be missed when looking at individual packet 
or session data that has not been aggregated into the statistical big picture view. 
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5. Tasks 
The information discussed in this section draws heavily from the work of Luttgens 
et al. (2014). All quoted material in this section is taken from this work, unless a separate 
source is explicitly indicated.  
Scheduled tasks provide another avenue by which to research and verify if 
malicious activity has occurred. “The Windows Task Scheduler provides the ability to 
automatically execute programs at a specific date and time or on a recurring basis” 
(Luttgens et al., 2014, p. 305). There are two ways to create scheduled tasks: the “at” 
command and the “schtasks” command. 
There is also a Management Console snap-in for manipulating tasks in the Vista 
and later version of Windows. However, for the purposes of this project, only at and 
schtasks commands will be discussed. 
Creating a scheduled task can most easily be done by using the at command. This 
command requires—at the least—local administrator privileges. In general, there are two 
types of tasks created: those for the local host and those for the target host (remotely 
created tasks). Tasks created using the at command have a relatively simple output. 
However, there is a fair number of indicators included, such as the dates and times for 
when certain programs or applications are to run. In addition, tasks can be run in very 
specified terms. For example, a task can be set to run at 03:00 every Monday, 
Wednesday, and Saturday. 
One important note about creating tasks remotely that needs to be taken into 
consideration is what time zone the target host is in. “Attackers often run the command 
net time \\targetHost prior to scheduling a remote task, to check the system’s local time” 
(Luttgens et al., 2014, p. 890). 
Whereas the at command is a relatively simple one, the schtasks command is 
more “full bodied.” It supports descriptive names, even more complex schedules, and 
many other features. However, because schtasks is a more complicated command, it is 
used less frequently than the at command by attackers. It is important to note that running 
the at command without parameters will only return scheduled tasks already created by 
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the same command. Running the schtasks command in the same fashion will, in contrast, 
return scheduled tasks created by both the at and schtasks commands. 
Configuration information for scheduled tasks is stored in .job files within the 
%SYSTEMROOTT%\Tasks directory. Using a hex editor one can view the data 
contained within .job files. Important information can be gleaned by using this method 
that is human readable. However, a tool that more thoroughly parses the .job files is 
preferable. 
6. Accounts 
All computer user accounts come with privileges. These privileges can increase or 
decrease on two different planes. 
When we are attempting to gain access to accounts that have a higher level 
of privilege than those that we presently have, this is known as vertical 
privilege escalation. When we are attempting to gain access to different 
accounts that what we have access to, but are at the same level as the 
account that we already have access to, this is known as horizontal 
privilege escalation (Andress & Winterfeld, 2014, p. 4341). 
Once an attacker gains access to the system as a user, there are a number of ways 
in which the vulnerabilities of a system may be exploited. In addition, what may be 
considered as a standard account on a system may already come equipped with the ability 
to act as an administrator, thereby immediately providing a hacker with greater access 
and “mobility” within a system. 
According to Luttgens et al. (2014), privilege escalation can be attained through 
password hash or token dumping followed by password cracking or a variety of other 
methods. It is relevant to note that a hacker’s priority may be to obtain access to user 
accounts that may not have administrative authority, but do have access rights to files or 
resources that will suit the hacker’s needs nonetheless. 
Regalado et al. (2015) reference “power permissions” as they pertain to the ability 
to grant write access, read disposition, and execute disposition. Permissions that allow 
write access cause “rewriting the service configuration and granting immediate and direct 
elevation of privilege.” The “read” disposition permissions also have many potential 
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impacts when being granted to untrusted or semi-trusted users. These include revealing 
the binary being run, what account is being used to run a service, current state of a 
service, which services are required, as well as several others. The execute disposition 
permission has to do with the ability to start, stop, or pause a given service. Suffice it to 
say, that escalation of privileges is a serious threat to systems (Regalado et al., (2015). 
7. Logs 
Event logs provide a wealth of information for data mining. By reviewing event 
logs, one can view such system events as: failed and successful logon attempts, the start 
and stop of services, alterations to the audit policy, track changes to permissions, and 
plenty of additional information (Luttgens et al., 2014). 
There are three main event logs maintained by Windows: Security, System, and 
Application. Each of these can be found in a separate file path stored in 
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Eventlog (Luttgens 
et al., 2014). In later versions of Windows, the default paths are: 
 Security: %SYSTEMROOT%\System32\Winevt\Logs\Security.evtx 
 System: %SYSYTEMROOT%\System32\Winevt\Logs\System.evtx 
 Application: SYSTEMROOT%\System32\Winevt\Logs\Application.evtx. 
According to Luttgens et al. (2014) two essential items required to fully 
understand event logs are event IDs (EIDs) and tracking and analyzing the events 
themselves. Every event tracked in Windows has an affiliated ID value. These IDs are 
useful when trying to research log events. Unfortunately there are hundreds of EIDs that 
may require additional exploration. However, to compensate for this, Microsoft provides 
the Events and Errors Message Center, which is a search engine for EID queries. This 
search engine also provides the ability to search for events containing particular text or 
which come from specific sources. 
Understanding how to read and interpret logon events is also necessary. There are 
many different things a member of an incident response team may be searching for, like 
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how a legitimate user accesses his/her system, or how a hacker gained remote access to it. 
The security event log can provide answers to questions such as these. 
Equally important as the Security event log is the System event log. Any time a 
service is started or stopped, the Service Control Manager (SCM) creates an entry to 
document the change. Unfortunately, starting, stopping, and changing services occurs 
frequently throughout the normal cycle of legitimate computer operation, and thus it is 
difficult to distinguish and weed-out those that are malicious in intent from the many 
others that otherwise look so similar. When examining a System event log, it is preferable 
to begin with a “known period of attacker activity” so there will be far fewer log entries 
to parse and wade through. Another useful tool is to search for “known-bad” service 
names within the System event log. 
The Application event log is the third “OS-native” event log from Windows. This 
log is especially helpful when logged events in either of the other two logs cannot be 
easily categorized. Antivirus alerts (in the application log) that are flagged during the 
time in question can help direct the investigation toward something fruitful, perhaps 
cueing the investigator where or what specifically to look at in the other two (security, 
system) logs (Luttgens et al., 2014). 
8. Advanced Memory and Disk Forensics 
Luttgens et al. (2014) suggest that the contents of memory (RAM) is a proven 
gold mine of digital evidence. While memory and disk forensics falls outside the scope of 
this project, it is instructive to address, even if very briefly, this owing to the tremendous 
amount of information it is likely to contain regarding relevant incident artifacts. 
“Memory,” in the case of Windows, entails both Random Access Memory (RAM) 
as well as hard disk (storage) to run processes. The reason that the hard disk may be 
involved is in the cases wherein the executable file may be larger than the amount of 
RAM used to manage its execution. In such cases, most modern OSs (Windows included) 
maintain swapped-out portions of the executable on the hard drive, swapping these 
portions (pages) into and out of RAM as calls are made to functions that are needed. In 
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the Windows OS, the pagefile is the main data structure used to maintain this 
coordinating information. 
“The term ‘physical memory’ simply refers to the contents of RAM” (Luttgens et 
al., 2014, p. 1027). In order to explore its contents for forensic purposes, one must get an 
image of it. The size of the image will directly mirror the size of RAM. If there are five 
gigabytes (GB) of RAM, then the image taken of the physical memory will also be five 
GB. Most often, software-based tools are required to retrieve memory from a Windows 
system. Fortunately, most of these tools are portable and can run on a USB drive. In some 
instances, the Firewire (IEEE13994) port can be used to access the physical memory of a 
target system, depending on the toolkit used (Luttgens et al., 2014). 
Once an image of the physical memory has been attained, it has to be translated 
into a more simplistic format. 
Tools such as the Volatility Framework and Redline can analyze an 
acquired memory image, recognize the intrinsic structures associated with 
user-land processes and the kernel, and parse them into human-readable 
format (Luttgens et al., 2014, p. 1029). 
This parsing of information offers the ability to view detailed process listings and 
all that is associated with these processes (Luttgens et al., 2014). 
The pagefile is a secondary storage space that stores memory for processes that 
cannot fit on the physical memory. It is also connected with RAM in that, as available 
RAM decreases, the pagefile is more active in moving data back and forth. The default 
location for the pagefile is %SYSTEMDRIVE%pagefile.sys. However, its location can 
be moved or even split over various files. If it appears to be missing, the Registry can 
help. Using the key and value HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session 
Manager\Memory Management\PagingFiles can help determine if another path has been 
used. Once it has been located, it cannot simply be copied using Windows Explorer or the 
command shell. A specific forensic utility is needed to get a copy of the pagefile from a 
running system. 
Crash dumps can be an effective way to analyze what went wrong that caused a 
system crash. There are three levels of crash dumps: Kernel Memory Dump, Small 
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Memory Dump, and Complete Memory Dump. The information that can come from 
these “dumps” can be pivotal during an investigation because it can provide data about 
the running processes, kernel data as well as other activities that were occurring at the 
time of the crash. 
Reviewing the process listing can also be beneficial to an investigation. 
Essentially, the process listing provides information as to what is running on a system. 
Executive Process (EPROCESS) blocks provide kernel data about these running 
processes. Performing memory forensics can extract things like process ID, process 
name, process command line, etc., from the list of EPROCESS blocks in kernel memory. 
It is relevant to note that the tool used will have to map out the parent-child relationships 
among the data extracted into a hierarchy tree. This is because “processes only track their 
parent process ID (PID) and not the parent process name or path” (Luttgens et al., 2014, 
p. 361). 
Because deep memory forensics falls outside the scope of this project, further 
detail is not necessary. However, other memory artifacts that can provide additional 
evidence are those of network connections, loaded drivers, console command history, 
strings in memory, and credentials (Luttgens et al., 2014). 
B. NETWORK SERVICES AND APPLICATIONS 
Though there are many areas within the WOC that may be attacked, there are 
others that exist outside of this domain. These can be found in network services and 
applications. Things like the DHCP, DNS, web applications, and Email are all additional 
surface areas outside of the end device’s OS that present potential for attack. 
1. Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol  
Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) is a framework which hackers are 
able to subvert. Essentially, the main purpose of DHCP is to assign Internet Protocol (IP) 
addresses to devices connected to the network (Luttgens et al., 2014). Therefore, it is no 
surprise that this mechanism provides an opportunity for malicious activity. 
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An example of this is DHCP spoofing. It begins with a DHCP client broadcasting 
a DHCPDISCOVER packet over the network. 
All listening and active DHCP servers would respond with DHCPOFFER 
packets offering a list of configuration parameters. The client then 
responds to one of the DHCPOFFERs with a DHCPREQUEST packet. 
The server completes the initialization process by transmitting a 
DHCPACK packet (Schiffman, O’Donnell, Pennington, & Pollino, 2003, 
p. 2903). 
During the DHCP packet exchange, an IP address, routing and Domain Name 
System (DNS) information to the DHCP client. Someone with ill intention could 
impersonate the DHCP server. They would be able to send a valid IP with invalid routing 
information. This would enable the hacker to view any and all traffic being transmitted 
over the connection (Schiffman et al., 2003). 
2. Domain Name System  
The Domain Name System (DNS) is the answer to an ever-broadening and vast 
Internet. DNS provides a mapping between alpha-numeric names of Internet addresses 
that are easier to use. This differs from IP addresses, which are purely numeric. An 
example is www.metsblog.com. Its corresponding IP address is 192.0.79.32. “It is 
impossible to have one single host file to relate every address with a name and vice 
versa” (Forouzan, 2010, p. 12206). The resolution to the original host file and its 
limitations for maintaining such a massive amount of information is the distributed and 
interactive functionality provided by the DNS. Name-to-IP mapping information is 
divided into smaller parts and spread across numerous DNS servers located throughout 
the Internet (Schiffman et al., 2003). 
At its very base, the use of the DNS involves query-reply-based communication 
between name clients and name servers for the purpose of the clients obtaining IP 
addresses of servers known only by name (Forouzan, 2010). As with any external 
transmission of data, there is risk of interception and/or alteration of access points. DNS 
spoofing involves a malicious user “listening” for DNS requests and responding with an 
IP address of their own choosing (with such choice NOT being a legitimate DNS server). 
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This would allow the malicious spoofer to “redirect all outgoing traffic through itself 
before forwarding the traffic along on its correct path; thus creating a “man in the 
middle” situation. A fully switched network would appear to get in the way of attackers 
sniffing data not directed to them. However, there are various ways in which a switch can 
be compromised, resulting in the device being forced to forward or flood packets that 
would not have otherwise gone to the attacker (Schiffman et al., 2003). 
3. Web 
Liston and Skoudis (2006) argue that web application attacks have emerged as an 
ever more popular method of exploiting hosts. Because the Internet is used for things like 
ecommerce, trading, voting, government, services, etc., it provides a large target of 
opportunity for nefarious actors. A common misconception is that, if a Secure Sockets 
Layer (SSL) is being implemented, the connection between the user and a site is 
impenetrable. While SSL does reinforce authentication and help protect data in transit, it 
does not mean that there is not any adversarial “work arounds” to get past this security 
protocol. Account harvesting and the undermining of Web application session tracking 
can both be done, even with SSL in place. 
Account harvesting can be accomplished when a user attempts to log in to a site 
with the incorrect user identification. It can also occur when a user has the correct user 
identification but the incorrect password. These are two separate attempt types and may 
not have been tried by the same perpetrator. This happens because even though both 
attempts would be denied, the browser header response is different for each. They would 
look exactly the same with the exception of the end note. The first may return an error 1 
notice whereas the latter would return an error 2 notice. It is exactly this variance that an 
attacker would look for. 
Another way in which Web applications can be exploited is via a browser’s 
cookies. “A cookie is simply an HTTP field that the browser stores on behalf of a Web 
server” (Liston & Skoudis, 2006, p. 412). There are two types of cookies: persistent and 
non-persistent. A persistent cookie is one that is written to a local file on the client 
machine upon the closing of a browser. It will be read by the Web server that created it 
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when the client returns to that Web server. A non-persistent cookie, on the other hand, is 
simply “forgotten” (not saved to memory) when the browser is closed. 
If a session is tracked via persistent cookies, a nefarious user could edit the local 
cookie file. According to Skoudis & Liston (2006): 
For Internet Explorer, cookies from different servers are stored in their 
own individual files in the Temporary Internet Files directory for each 
user…To exploit a session ID based on a persistent cookie, the attacker 
can log in to the application to get a session ID, close the browser to write 
the cookie file, edit the cookies using his or her favorite text editor and 
relaunch the browser, now using the new session ID (Skoudis & Liston, 
2006, p. 414) 
This can be relatively easily accomplished without the user ever realizing what has 
occurred. 
4. Email 
Email is arguably the most utilized source of commercial communication, and its 
worldwide usage continues to advance at a rapid pace. It is precisely because of this that 
it can be used as a prime target for malicious purposes. Email content can be broken 
down into two sections: body and header. The body consists of content—including 
attachments—whereas the header is a compilation of sender and recipient email 
addresses, timestamps, server information and more. 
Luttgens, Mandia, and Pepe (2014) reference the four most common types of 
email they have encountered as Microsoft Outlook for Windows, Microsoft Outlook for 
OS X, Apple Mail, and Web mail. For the purposes of this project, we will concentrate on 
Web mail and Microsoft Outlook. 
Web mail pertains to services like Gmail, Yahoo!, and AOL. It is not typical for 
these types of services to store content on a local system. In the case of web mail, most 
information attained will likely come in the form of browser artifacts. In addition, 
because Web-based email services are continuously changing, “traditional” tools are less 
likely to provide a thorough analysis of what may have transpired within an individual 
account. However, a “well-maintained specialized tool” may offer more of an advantage 
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when attempting to discover artifacts. Perhaps the most effective method for examining 
Web mail information is to narrow the time frame of suspected malicious behavior first, 
and then investigate all aspects of the system that could potentially be impacted. These 
include browser history, Registry logs, file system, etc. This may provide the best way to 
get an all-inclusive picture as to what happened. 
Microsoft Outlook is a major email client that is utilized by a plethora of companies 
and agencies. One of the reasons for this is that it supports many different protocols. For 
example, Outlook can operate with Post Office Protocol (POP), Internet Message Access 
Protocol (IMAP), Microsoft Exchange, and a number of Web (or HTTP) based services. 
These are independent of the third party add-ins that provide even more capabilities to 
Outlook. It is important to note that the directories where Outlook files are located by 
default can be modified by the user. A good place to begin looking is 
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office\[version]\Outlook\Search\Catalog. 
“Version” here refers to the Office version number. 
In addition, Outlook has the capacity for configuring multiple “profiles.” These 
profiles are stored under a different location than the one aforementioned. A default 
profile is useful so that it can be eliminated from any additional profiles subsequently 
created. 
The data format that is used by Outlook is the Personal Folder File (PFF). 
Outlook will also store an email copy offline in the Offline Storage Table (OST). These 
files can be analyzed by two different types of tools: commercial forensics tools and open 
source tools. These types of tools have the capability to view the file structure and display 
the file contents as a tree, as well as compile an executable using “libpff” that can export 
files (Luttgens et al., 2014). 
Just as important as recognizing and making proper use of IOCs is the ability to 
have a firm grasp of the prominent incident investigative tools used in the field.  
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IV. PROMINENT INCIDENT INVESTIGATIVE TOOLS 
One of the most essential keys to effective incident response is to be both 
knowledgeable about, and able to “cultivate” (i.e., modify, improve, extend) the tools 
involved. For situations where any number of tools can be utilized, the best place to start 
is by investigating the most prominent tools available. Some items include use of the 
command line, TCPview, and Regshot, but the list is not necessarily limited to these 
items. However, as these specific tools pertain to the scenarios described later, these are 
the tools highlighted and addressed here. 
A. ABSENCE OF DEEP FORENSICS 
The term digital forensics is an exceptionally broad term and can be used when 
referring to numerous aspects of the process of incident response. Dezfoli et al. (2013) 
define digital forensics as the process that “involves collection, preservation, analysis and 
presentation of evidence from digital sources” (p. 48). Because there are many digital 
sources, this definition encompasses a wide variety of potential evidence, it is difficult to 
narrow down all that it entails. It is precisely for this reason that the tools and methods 
presented here are intended to illustrate a “broad stroke” of all that is available. It is 
necessary to differentiate between what is to be considered an incident responder versus a 
digital forensics expert. Essentially, an incident responder is similar to an emergency first 
responder (medical, rescue, or law enforcement). These are the individuals who know the 
essentials and can get a person (or organization) back to a stabilized functioning state. 
Pursuing the medical first responder analogy further, the digital forensics expert is more 
akin to a surgeon; someone with deeper technical understanding who is able to discern 
the “root cause” of an ailment and render sophisticated remedies. Incident responders 
have a certain set of “quick react” skills and tools, whereas a digital forensics expert will 
rely on more specialized knowledge and tools. Forensic Toolkit (FTK), EnCase, and 
IDAPro are all examples of more “industrial-strength” malware analysis tools that are 
often utilized by digital forensic experts. While these tools are slightly beyond the scope 
of this research, they do require discussion. 
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FTK is a major digital forensics software tool created by AccessData. It has 
capabilities that include broad encryption support, comprehensive index and binary 
search, Internet and chat analysis, and single-node remote investigations. In addition, it 
also incorporates a standalone disk imager that calculates hash values and can be saved in 
several format types. This is more of an all-inclusive tool and something that would more 
likely be used by a digital forensics expert as opposed to an incident responder. 
EnCase is another example of a major contender in the market for digital 
forensics software. It is developed by Guidance Software and offers a great deal in terms 
of not only thorough investigation but specialized investigation by issue and/or industry. 
Fields like financial services, healthcare, government and law enforcement can all benefit 
from this software. In addition, the output of this software can be accepted as evidence in 
court. Again, this is outside of the focus of this work, but it is worth knowing that this 
type of product is available. 
IDAPro differs from the aforementioned software in that it is more narrowly 
focused as a multi-processor disassembler and debugger intended to map the execution 
space of executable code. Per Sikorski and Honig (2012), there are levels of languages 
used when discussing the operation of malware. These include high-level language, 
machine code, and low level language (typically assembly). Malware creators typically 
create their code using a high-level language that  is subsequently compiled into machine 
code in order to be in executable form. This differs from the situation where analysts 
operate, which usually entails starting at the machine code level, then possibly 
disassembling it into more human-readable assembly code. Analysts reverse engineer this 
assembly code to determine how it works as well as its purpose. Reverse engineering 
refers to breaking down the whole to view and understand its working parts. It is an 
invaluable tool for an incident response team to utilize. 
All of these programs can provide intense and thorough evaluations of a given 
system or systems. However, the focus of this research has been to demonstrate a bigger 
picture of the techniques, methodologies, and tools utilized in incident response. The 
reliance here is on the things that can be learned and understood by the incident 
responder quickly. It also is to provide a foundation for the argument that the rudimentary 
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skills of incident response can be learned via interaction with incidents that have been 
conveniently captured in highly portable VMs.  
B. DEDICATED UTILITIES 
1. Quick Checksum Verifier 
Quick Checksum Verifier (QVC) is a tool that is used to determine if there has 
been a change in a document or file by using MD-5 or SHA-1 hash functions. A file is 
loaded into the QVC and a hash value is created. It is important to note that a hash is a 
numerical value obtained from text and a one-way function/algorithm. The created hash 
value is saved and compared to future hash values of the file. At any future time one may 
verify the integrity of the file by re-hashing it and comparing the newly generated hash 
value to the original for that file. If the values differ, something in the file has changed 
(lost integrity). 
2. PEView 
Sikorski and Honig (2012) reference the Portable Executable (PE) view as an 
excellent tool for viewing the PE file structure. It allows the user to view valuable header 
information, individual sections, as well as import and export tables. It is through the use 
of PEView that thread local storage (TLS) callbacks can be effectively utilized. 
Many people assume that when they load a program into a debugger, the process 
will pause as soon as the program executes an instruction. However, this does not always 
happen. The majority of debuggers actually begin where the PE header defines the 
program’s entry point to be. The benefit of a TLS callback is that it can execute before 
the designated entry point, and thereby execute secretly. 
Basically, TLS allows each thread to maintain a different value for a 
variable declared using TLS. When TLS is implemented by an executable, 
the code will typically contain a .tls section in the PE header… TLS 
supports callback functions for initialization and termination of TLS data 
objects (Sikorski & Honig, 2012, p. 9310). 
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A way to discover TLS callbacks is to review the .tls section through PEview. 
“Normally functioning” programs do not usually use the .tls section, so if it is there it 
should be considered a red flag. 
3. Process Explorer 
Another useful tool for researching whether malicious activity is happening is 
through Process Explorer. Essentially, it is an extremely powerful task manager. Process 
Explorer monitors and displays processes in a tree format that clearly shows the parent 
and child relationships among the processes. In addition to the formatting, further 
organization and clarity of function is displayed with color-coding. New processes—
coded in green—tend to be the primary source for initial investigation. 
4. TCPView 
TCPview is used to detect potential malicious attacks to the network. It has the 
capability of graphically displaying detailed listings of all endpoints (TCP and UDP) on 
the system. It can be helpful in the event a process is connecting over a port but what 
process is making the connection is unknown (Sikorski & Honig, 2012). 
5. Regshot 
Regshot allows for Registry comparison by taking snapshots of a pre-infected and 
post-infected system. This allows the incident response team to evaluate what changes 
are made to the system by the particular malware that was used. Unfortunately, the results 
will often require plenty of patient scanning and comparison to decipher where the 
pertinent information is. 
C. COMMAND LINE 
The command line is a great tool for cyber defenders. This tool is built into every 
Windows operating system. Many prefer the graphical tools because it is easier to look at 
and decipher information. The fact of the matter is the graphical tools could be 
compromised or may not be available all together during a cyber emergency. In addition, 
execution of graphical tools on a potentially infected system may cause new processes 
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and files to be generated or opened, thereby modifying the operational state of the 
system. This could actually corrupt forensic data. However, if graphical tools are still 
preferred, having a knowledge of certain basic commands should be acquired.  
1. Netstat 
Just like the graphical tool TCPview, utilizing this command with its parameters 
allows an IT professional to monitor network connections. By inputting the command 
netstat ? a person can see all the parameters that netstat provides. This is illustrated in 
Figures 1, 2 and 3. 
Figure 1.  Netstat Parameters View 
 
Netstat? shows parameters used with netstat. 
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Figure 2.  Netstat View 2 
 
Netstat -a displays all active connections. 
 39 
Figure 3.  Continuation of Netstat -a 
 
 
2. Viewing Events 
Windows has what is known as the Event Viewer, which logs many events that 
are deemed most useful for system monitoring and troubleshooting. It also has an audit 
setting that allows the operator to tailor what they wish to view. For example: the user 
may indicate there are specific kinds events they want logged or they may adjust for the 
degree of detail provided for the events that are logged. The events that are logged can be 
viewed through the command line without accessing the tool using powershell. Figure 4 
shows one (security) of the three principal logs accessible by Event Viewer. This output 
is obtainable by use of the command get-eventlog “security.” The name within the 
quotations is the name of the log you want to view. This command allows an 
administrator to view security log entries that have not been deleted. The output shown 
was further narrowed by appending the command modifier, “-newest 20,” to the 
command so as to only display the most recent 20 log entries.  
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Figure 4.  Command Get-eventlog “Security”-Newest 20 
 
Shows the 20 newest entries in the security log 
 
3. Viewing Processes and Services 
Just like Process Explorer, the tasklist command shows all processes and services 
running on a machine, as displayed in Figure 5. 
 41 
Figure 5.  Tasklist Command 
 
All running processes and services 
4. System File Integrity 
It is very common for attackers to manipulate or replace files in order to gain 
system level access to Windows systems. For this reason, it is a good idea to verify the 
hash signatures of suspect files. The Windows tool System File Checker verifies the 
signature of files, and if they are not found or are fraudulent, they will be replaced by the 
tool. The tool is run with the command sigverif as illustrated in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6.  Command SIGVERIF 
 
Vimbase.dll has been found to not have a digital signature. 
5. File or Document Integrity 
Whereas system files are computer files that the OS uses to function properly, a 
“regular” file stores information created by users. Much like the Quick Checksum 
Verifier, the information provided via the dir command allows an administrator to tell 
when files or documents have been modified. If it is known that such files should not 
have been modified, it would be a good idea to investigate further. This is illustrated by 
Figures 7 and 8. 
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Figure 7.  View of Files 
 
The document G was modified at 1:56 p.m. on August 25. 
Figure 8.  Command Dir /T:W 
 
 
The date and time the document G was last modified. 
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V. INCIDENT RESPONSE LAB SCENARIOS 
The scenarios provided in this chapter offer guided practical exercises that 
provide realistic experiences with compromised systems (captured as VM). These 
provide the incident responder with the opportunity to make informed decisions 
regarding which artifacts should be examined as well as which tools are best suited for 
each situation. 
A. SCENARIO 1—DOCUMENT AND FILE INTEGRITY  
(1) Target Time to Complete: 30 minutes 
(2) Lab Description: Use the Quick Checksum Verifier (QCV) to confirm 
the integrity of documents and files. 
(3) Expected Knowledge, Skills and Abilities to Complete: The student will 
need to know what hashes are and that hashes are used by tools such as the 
QCV to confirm the integrity of files and documents.  
(4) Source VM and System Requirements to Run: In order to conduct this 
lab, VMware Workstation must be installed. This lab scenario uses the 
Windows 8 operating system.  
(5) Lab Setup: The instructor will add 100 files and documents to the desktop 
and construct a Master Hash Printout for all files and documents. One 
paragraph of the file Lab2a will be deleted by the instructor. The instructor 
will then clone the VMware Workstation lab environment and name it Lab 
1 for future student use. 
(6) Lab Write Up and Analysis    
(i) Title: File and Document Integrity 
(ii) Introduction: The purpose of the lab is to teach the student how to 
operate a file integrity tool to determine if a file has been changed. 
The student will need to know how to operate the QCV and how to 
compare the tool’s output hash with the hash on the Master Hash 
Printout. Also, this lab teaches the student how painful it can be to 
check the integrity of multiple files with a tool like QCV. 
(iii) Tools: QCV is a tool that is used to determine if there has been a 
change in a document or file using MD-5 or SHA-1 hash functions. A 
file is loaded into the QVC and a hash value is created. The created 
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hash value is saved and compared to future values of the file to 
determine if the file has been modified. 
(iv) Results: Provide screen shots with a brief description that convey 
pertinent indicators of compromise. This is depicted by Figures 9 and 
10. 
Figure 9.  List of Hashes Taken on All Files Before the Start of the Lab  
 




To load the file into the tool, click the folder that is to the right of the path 
window. The student should observe that the hash is different than the hash on the Master 
Hash File. 
B. SCENARIO 2—USE WINDOWS EVENT VIEWER TO LOOK FOR 
SUSPICIOUS EVENTS  
(1) Target Time to Complete: 30 minutes 
(2) Lab Description: Utilize Windows Event Viewer to look through 200 
Windows events. Use screen shot suspicious events for the lab write up. 
(3) Expected Knowledge, Skills and Abilities to Complete: The student will 
need to know what the application, security, and system event logs are, 
and that the Event Viewer is the built-in Windows utility used to 
view/review them. The student will inspect one or more of Windows’ 
three native logs to determine if an incident has occurred. 
(4) Source VM and System Requirements to Run: In order to conduct this 
lab, VMware Horizon Client must be installed. This lab scenario uses a 
Windows 7 operating system. 
(5) Lab Set Up: Malware will be executed in the virtual environment. This 
malware should be downloaded from the EC-Council CEHV8 Module 07 
DVD located in the Viruses and Worms folder. After the instructor 
confirms that there are 200 events in the event viewer and the malware is 
executed, a clone of the VMware Workstation environment will be taken 
by the instructor and named Lab2 for future student use. For this scenario 
the student will be told there are only four user accounts: Matthew, Kira, 
George, and Ted. Also, executables are not allowed on this particular 
machine. 
(6) Lab Write Up and Analysis    
(i) Title: Using Event Viewer 
(ii) Introduction: The purpose of the lab is to teach the student how to 
operate and read the Event Viewer Utility. Looking at logs is a 
painstaking process and can be very difficult to spot suspicious 
behavior when you are looking through thousands of line items. It 
takes a good deal of time to go through 200 events. 
(iii) Tools: Event Viewer was utilized to discover suspicious activity for 
this lab. Event logs provide a wealth of information for data mining. 
By reviewing event logs, one can view such system events as: failed 
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and successful logon attempts, the start and stop of services, 
alterations to the audit policy, track changes to permissions, and 
plenty of additional information (Luttgens et al., 2014). 
 There are three main event logs maintained by Windows: Security, 
System, and Application. Each of these can be found in a separate file 
path stored in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\ 
SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Eventlog (Luttgens et al., 
2014). 
(iv) Results: Provide screen shots with a brief description that convey 
pertinent indicators of compromise. This can be seen in Figures 11 
and 12. 
Figure 11.  Security Log 
 
This username is not one of the four authorized accounts for this machine. 
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Figure 12.  Application Log 
 
Here it shows the problem signature blem.exe. Executables are unauthorized. 
C. SCENARIO 3—ANALYSIS OF NETWORK CONNECTIONS 
(1) Target Time to Complete: 30 minutes 
(2) Lab Description: Use TCPview to look through two weeks of saved 
network connections. Screen shot suspicious connections for the lab write 
up. 
(3) Expected Knowledge, Skills and Abilities to Complete: The student 
must know what the TCPView utility is used for monitoring network 
connections specifically TCP and UDP endpoints. 
(4) Source VM and System Requirements to Run: In order to conduct this 
lab VMware Workstation must be installed. This lab scenario uses the 
Windows 7 operating system. 
(5) Lab Setup: Malware will be executed in the virtual environment. The 
malware is downloaded from the EC-Council CEHV8 Module 07 DVD 
located in the Viruses and Worms folder. Once the instructor has sufficient 
saved network connections in the TCPview tool and the malware has been 
executed the instructor will clone the VMware Workstation lab 
environment and name it Lab3 for future student use. 
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Lab Write Up and Analysis:  
(i) Title: Analysis of Network Connections Introduction 
(ii) Introduction: The purpose of the lab is to teach the student how to 
operate and decipher network connections using TCPView. 
Sometimes it can be very difficult to determine if a network 
connection is malicious or not because many attackers are good at 
hiding malicious connections in plain sight. In order to detect 
malicious network connections defenders must constantly monitor 
network activity with tools.  
(iii) Tools: TCPview is used to detect potential malicious attacks to the 
network. It has the capability of graphically displaying detailed 
listings of all endpoints (TCP and UDP) on the system. It can be 
helpful in the event that a process connects over a port but what 
process is making the connection is unknown (Sikorski. & Honig, 
2012) 
(iv) Results: Provide screen shots with a brief description that convey 
pertinent indicators of compromise. These can be viewed in Figures 
13 and 14. 
Figure 13.  TCPView 
 
The top two process names do not make sense. 
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Figure 14.  TCPView—Firefox Connections 
 
 
These Firefox connections are suspicious. The firefox.exe processes have the 
same process identifier and are communicating on local ports 49191-4923. Forty TCP 
endpoints is very high for one process identifier. The remote ports are http or https, which 
are very common ports used by attackers. These remote ports are usually not being 
watched or blocked by defenders due to their heavy network traffic. In addition, these 
ports are usually open for authorized use. 
D. SCENARIO 4—PROCESS OR SERVICE ANALYSIS 
(1) Target Time to Complete: 30 minutes 
(2) Lab Description: Monitor processes and services with Process Explorer. 
Suspicious events are captured using screen shots for the lab write up. 
(3) Expected Knowledge, Skills and Abilities to Complete: The student will 
need to know how to properly read the process explorer output and also 
how to spot service or processes that may be malicious. The student will 
need to know what the colors pink, blue, green, and red mean when the 
process viewer highlights the various services and processes. Also, the 
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student will need to know what a malicious service or process looks like 
within the process viewer. 
(4) Source VM and System Requirements to Run: In order to conduct this 
lab VMware Workstation must be installed. This lab scenario is using a 
Windows 7 operating system 
(5) Lab Setup: Malware will be executed in the virtual environment. The 
malware is downloaded from the EC-Council CEHV8 Module 07 DVD 
located in the Viruses and Worms folder. Processes and services from the 
two last weeks of the computer’s operations will be saved inside process 
explorer. Once the instructor has sufficient processes and services in the 
tool and the malware has been executed the instructor will clone the 
VMware Workstation lab environment and name it Lab 4 for future 
student use. 
(6) Lab Write Up and Analysis:  
(i) Title: Process and Service Monitoring 
(ii) Introduction: The purpose of the lab is to teach the student how to 
operate and decipher processes and services using process explorer. 
Sometimes it can be very difficult to determine if a service or process 
connection is malicious or not, because many attackers are good at 
hiding malicious processes and services in plain sight. In order to 
detect malicious services and processes network defenders must 
constantly monitor them with various tools. 
(iii) Tools: Process Explorer monitors and displays processes in a tree 
format that clearly shows the parent and child relationships among the 
said processes. In addition to the formatting, further organization and 
clarity of function is provided through the use of color-coded 
displays. New processes—coded in green—tend to be the primary 
source for initial investigation (Sikorski & Honig, 2012). This is all 
depicted in Figure 15. 
(iv) Results: Provide screen shots with a brief description that convey 
pertinent indicators of compromise. 
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Figure 15.  Process Explorer 
 
Firefox.exe and Tcpview.exe do not have a company name description. Malware authors 
frequently forget to add them when constructing malware.  
E. SCENARIO 5—TASK SCHEDULER ANALYSIS 
(1) Target Time to Complete: 30 minutes 
(2) Lab Description: Investigate places within a computer that maybe used to 
automatically execute programs at a specific date and time and where 
these executables are stored. Screen shot suspicious tasks and/or locations 
where the binaries are stored for the lab write up. 
(3) Expected Knowledge, Skills and Abilities to Complete: The student 
must know where the Scheduled Task Manager can be found and that it 
can be used to execute malware. Also, only an administrator can schedule 
a task. The administrator account for this machine is Matthew. 
(4) Source VM and System Requirements to Run: In order to conduct this 
lab VMware Workstation must be installed. This lab scenario uses the 
Windows 7 operating system 
(5) Lab Setup: Malware will be downloaded into the Windows Task 
Scheduler. The malware is downloaded from the EC-Council CEHV8 
Module 07 DVD located in the Viruses and Worms folder. The malware 
must be downloaded into the scheduler with an account other than 
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Matthew. Hundreds of good scheduled tasks will be placed in the 
scheduler to provide complexity for the lab. After the instructor places the 
good tasks and malware into the scheduler the instructor will then clone 
the VMware Workstation lab environment and name it Lab 5 for future 
student use. 
(6) Lab Write Up and Analysis   
(i) Title: Task Scheduler Analysis 
(ii) Introduction: The purpose of the lab is to teach the student how to 
inspect the Task Scheduler and spot malicious scheduled tasks. 
Sometimes it can be very difficult to determine if a task is malicious 
or not because many attackers are good at hiding in plain sight. 
(iii) Tools: “The Windows Task Scheduler provides the ability to 
automatically execute programs at a specific date and time or on a 
recurring basis” (Luttgens et al., 2014, p.305). This can be seen in 
Figures16 and 17. 
(iv) Results: Provide screen shots with a brief description that convey 
pertinent indicators of compromise. 
Figure 16.  NortonsUpdate 
 
This is a common place where attackers place malicious items if they only have 
command shell access. 
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Figure 17.  Author’s Username David 
 
David is not the authorized administrator account. 
F. SCENARIO 6—EXECUTABLE ANALYSIS 
(1) Target Time to Complete: 45 minutes 
(2) Lab Description: Use PEview to investigate 200 executables to determine 
if they contain malware. Suspicious events are captured using screen shots 
for the lab write up.  
(3) Expected Knowledge, Skills and Abilities to Complete: The student 
must know that malware utilizes thread local storage callbacks, which is 
used by malware to execute its code. The student must also know that the 
TLS table can be found in the IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER, which is 
found under the IMAGE_NT_HEADERS using the PEview tool. TLS 
callbacks are usually not used by applications that do not contain malware 
(Sikorski & Honig, 2012) 
(4) Source VM and System Requirements to Run: In order to conduct this 
lab VMware Workstation must be installed. This lab scenario uses the 
Windows 7 operating system. 
(5) Lab Setup: A malware executable will be placed into a folder on the 
desktop with 199 other non-malicious executables. The malware is 
downloaded from the viruses and worms folder on the EC-Council 
CEHV8 Module 07 DVD. Once the instructor adds the 199 non malicious 
executables and the executable with malware the instructor will then clone 
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the VMware Workstation lab environment and name it Lab 6 for future 
student use. 
(6) Lab Write Up and Analysis   
(i) Title: Executable Analysis 
(ii) Introduction: The purpose of the lab is to teach the student how to 
operate and determine if an executable is malicious using PEview. 
Sometimes it can be very difficult to determine if an executable is 
malicious or not, because many attackers are good at hiding malicious 
executables in plain sight  
(iii) Tools: The Portable Executable (PE) View is a tool for viewing the 
PE file structure. It allows the user to view header information, 
individual sections, as well as import and export tables of functions 
operating on the system. Through the use of PEView, thread local 
storage (TLS) callbacks can be effectively utilized (Sikorski & Honig, 
2012). The executable is displayed in Figure 18 and its referencing 
the TLS callback is shown in Figure 19. 
(iv) Results: Provide screen shots with a brief description that convey 
pertinent indicators of compromise. 
Figure 18.  View of the “Blem” Executable 
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Figure 19.  Blem.exe with a TLS Table in the Image Header 
 
The TLS Table indicates that blem.exe is potentially malware. 
G. SCENARIO 7—REGISTRY ANALYSIS 
(1) Target Time to Complete: 60 minutes  
(2) Lab Description: Use Regshot to complete a daily scan of the Registry. 
Screen shot anything suspicious for the lab write up. 
(3) Expected Knowledge, Skills and Abilities to Complete: The student will 
need to know the impossibility of going through the Registry line item by 
line item and how to use the Regshot tool. A Regshot image is taken every 
day at a specific time and is compared to the previous day’s image to 
check for potential malicious content. The student must know how to spot 
potential malicious items on the output comparing the two snapshots. 
(4) Source VM and System Requirements to Run: In order to conduct this 
lab VMware Workstation must be installed. This lab scenario uses the 
Windows 7 operating system. 
(5) Lab Setup: Malware will be executed in the virtual environment. The 
malware is downloaded from the EC-council CEHV8 Module 07 DVD 
located in the Viruses and Worms folder. The instructor must take a 
snapshot of the Registry prior to the execution of the malware. 
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After the instructor takes the snapshot and executes the malware the 
instructor will then clone the VMware Workstation lab environment and 
name it Lab 7 for future student use.  
(6) Lab Write Up and Analysis   
(i) Title: Registry Analysis 
(ii) Introduction: The purpose of the lab is to teach the student how to 
operate regshot and determine if anything malicious is hiding in the 
Registry. This is extremely difficult because the Registry has many 
files and it is constantly changing with each action conducted on the 
machine. In order to detect malicious items in the Registry network 
defenders must be constantly monitoring it with various tools.   
(iii) Tools: Regshot allows for Registry comparison by taking snapshots 
of a pre-infected and post-infected system as seen in Figure 20. This 
allows the Incident Response team to identify changes made to the 
system by the malware as shown in Figure 21. Unfortunately, the 
results will often require plenty of patient scanning to decipher where 
the pertinent information is (displayed in Figure 22). 
(iv) Results: Provide screen shots with a brief description that convey 
pertinent indicators of compromise. 




Figure 21.  Second Registry Snapshot 
 
Figure 22.  MUICache Display 
 
MUICache signifies possible malware. When the program is investigated that generated 
the MUICache key more often than not, it can be identified as malware (Carvey, 2014).  
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK  
Cyber incident response incorporates all knowledge, skills, techniques, and tools 
used to prevent and detect malicious activity, as well as recover a corrupted system. The 
information provided here promotes the use of the virtual machines in incident response 
education. While incident response education can be delivered via lectures and reading, a 
way to imbue the incident responder with greater familiarity and confidence in the 
material is to provide realistic scenarios for training purposes. The best way to 
accomplish this is through the use of VMs. 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
Incident response is an iterative process. This is to say the process entails a 
continuous cycling effort to: establish defenses, detect, identify and fix problems, and then 
learn from the experience in order to improve the process prior to the next incident. The 
technical terms used to explain these phases are Preparation, Identification, Containment, 
Eradication, Recovery, and Lessons Learned. The U.S. Navy, like other organizations, is 
highly dependent upon information systems and networks to conduct its various missions. 
Thus, it is important to ensure better preparation for incident handling, by improving the 
education of Navy personnel most directly relied upon to provide this vital service.  
A way to learn how to effectively defend a system is through the use of exercises 
hosted on virtual machines (VMs). Chapter II covered the concept of VM and the many 
benefits of using them in incident response education. VMs can be used to provide students 
with hands-on experience with the types of attacks perpetrators use, as well as a way of 
directly interacting with and investigating them. A VM is self-contained and portable, 
which means it can be delivered via a drop box or flash drive without risk of harming the 
actual machine it is ultimately to be run (“played”) on. Should a student inadvertently make 
a mistake on their VM, they can revert (or “renew”) it back to its state prior to the mistake 
so long as snap shots have been taken throughout the activity conducted. This affords a 
more risk-free learning environment in which to practice and learn. VMs, thus, are 
convenient, low-risk as well as cost-effective for incident response training. They also 
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provide a convenient means with which to capture intentionally pre-infected systems that 
can then be used for incident response education. 
Another aspect of good incident response training is the ability to isolate prominent 
IOCs (indicators of compromise). Chapter III enumerated several prominent system 
artifacts that would serve as logical starting points when performing a live incident 
response. These include the events, and various residual data that would (should) indicate 
to the student that an incident is likely to have occurred. Because the majority of Naval 
systems use the Windows Operating System (WOS), it was the system chosen for the 
exercises described in this study. The WinOS has many components that can potentially 
capture/indicate/reveal IOCs. The Registry, processes, certain files, network connections, 
tasks, accounts, logs, and memory and disk information all provide system artifacts that can 
be investigated for signs of infection/exploitation. Thorough knowledge of these aspects of 
the WinOS lends insight into what is and is not functioning normally, as well as pointing 
the investigation to other likely indicators and evidence. 
In addition to the operating system, network services and applications are areas that 
can also be mined for potential IOCs. Commonly targeted services are DHCP, DNS, Web, 
and email. These are often taken advantage of by hackers through many different tactics. It 
is equally important that an incident responder know the intricacies of these items and 
where the “weaknesses” lie, as is having a broad understanding of the host operating 
system that they run on. 
There are numerous investigative tools that can be utilized in support of an incident 
investigation. Rather than attempt to cover all of them, this study focused on those that are 
most prominent (i.e., frequently used) in the area of incident response. These consist of 
dedicated add-on utilities, as well as OS-native command line programs. Some dedicated 
utilities often used are the Quick Checksum Verifyer, PEview, Process Explorer, 
TCPView, and Regshot. Some common OS-native command line tools and capabilities 
include netstat event viewer, viewing running processes and services, and verifying system 
file integrity checksums. All these contribute to additional system IOC examination. 
Incident response differs from digital forensics in that an incident responder can be 
likened to a medical first responder (paramedic), whereas a forensics expert would be 
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comparable to a surgeon. An incident responder is intended to provide quick and 
immediate assistance to get a system back to proper functioning order (breathing restored 
and bleeding stopped by paramedic); whereas a forensics expert has the more sophisticated 
knowledge and tools needed to dig deeper into the root cause(s) of an incident (treatment of 
occluded artery by surgeon). Because of the heavy reliance on technology by the Navy, it is 
imperative that a robust incident response capability be maintained. The use of virtual 
machines in this capacity can prove very valuable. Virtual machines provide a “risk-free” 
environment for students to manipulate and interact with key investigative tools in order to 
identify, scope, contain and perhaps eliminate system exploits.  
In furtherance of the above articulated goal of advancing incident response teaching 
via pre-infected VMs, seven compromised system “scenarios” were created that entailed 
analysis of the principal first responder WinOS artifacts (PUFNTAL); each captured in a 
separate VM. Through generating these scenarios and the research conducted here, we have 
made informed decisions regarding which of the many potential “attack craft” artifacts 
should be represented in this set of compromised systems. The scenarios presented here 
provide students with the opportunity to apply their knowledge of incident response tools, 
IOCs, and methodologies, as they go about using tools, knowledge and methodology to 
identify the IOCs in each scenario.  
B. FUTURE WORK 
The idea described in this study was fairly narrow in scope: identify the dominant 
WinOS artifacts used in incident response investigation, capture them in separate scenario-
based pre-infected VMs, then discuss the tools useful in conducting such investigations. 
This scope could be greatly widened by developing additional incident response VM 
scenarios. Likely candidates for additional scenarios include: a) examining different OSs, 
b) adding additional artifact types (e.g., network traffic and firewall logs), c) creating 
hybrid incident scenarios that require the investigator to correlate several artifact types, and 
d) adding additional analysis tools.  
Gone are the days of Windows reigning as the champion (and pretty much sole) OS 
used by the masses. While the majority still utilize Windows and various versions of it, 
today there are more options. Ubuntu, Linux Mint, Macintosh OSX, Android and Fedora 
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are all alternatives to the dominant Windows OS. Additional research can be conducted as 
related to the information provided here to this end. Separate, dedicated, VMs can be set up 
that address these other alternatives, allowing the individual to extend their knowledge of 
incident response as it pertains to an OS other than Windows. In addition, because many 
servers are UNIX/Linux based they are often a target for malicious attacks. The research 
could be broadened to take this into account 
More artifact types can be examined. The Windows Registry keys and values and 
DNS queries were discussed here. However, others such as the persistence mechanism—
which allows malware to survive reboots and logins—specifically could be mined for 
future work. In addition, artifacts from Skype, Facebook chat, and other instant messaging 
services may be further researched. These items are specifically interesting because they 
are commonly used by Naval personnel for communication purposes as they are frequently 
away from their families. 
Only a few types of incidents have been delved into here. The idea was to focus on 
those that are most common so as to concentrate the type of education provided. This being 
stated, with time comes evolution of attackers’ methods. Because of this, the kinds of 
incidents to experiment with are many. An extension of the work submitted here would be 
to provide alternate incidents for examination. 
There is much that can be done to expand upon the ideas addressed here. The use of 
VM in incident response promises to be extremely beneficial to students for training 
purposes and testing the effectiveness of these scenarios will exemplify this. It not only 
provides the opportunity to make the best use of their knowledge in a hands-on yet 
controlled environment; but it also allows for experimentation with multiple types and 
severities of incidents. The implication of the use of VMs as a source of education needs to 
be established as criteria for graduate work as well as incident response training throughout 
the Navy. 
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